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Abstract 
Domestic resource mobilization is becoming increasingly important 
in many developing countries because of the problems they are facing in 
attaining additional foreign resources and aid. But in many countries 
systematic disincentives must be removed before the full rural deposit 
mobilization potential can be realized. This paper presents an analysis 
of rural deposit mobilization in four Asian countries: Bangladesh, Indo-
nesia, the Philippines and Thailand. With the exception of Bangladesh, 
there is no clear upward trend in share of rural deposits relative to 
total deposits. Institutions specializing in rural lending appear to 
mobilize an even smaller share of their total resources than the rest 
of the banking system. 
Determinants of savings behavior are discussed considering incentives 
for both savers and lenders. Administered interest rates are id~ntified 
as a problem because they often result in negative real rates on deposits 
for savers while making rediscount and other government funds cheaper for 
banks/branches than mobilizing deposits. Efforts to expand banks/branches 
into rural areas have been thwarted by credit policies which make them 
unviable. Therefore, reforms in interest rates and other financial poli-
cies are often a necessary first step in expanding rural deposit mobili-
zation. 
RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IN ASIA 
INTRODUCTION 
Domestic resource mobilization is becoming increasingly important 
in many developing nations, in part because of problems they are facing 
in obtaining additional foreign resources. Commercial lenders are fright-
ened by high levels of foreign indebtedness. Donor agencies are reluct-
ant to provide additional large grants and loans because they are also 
concerned about indebtedness and their total real resources are no longer 
growing at a rapid rate. Concern is also mounting over the past inef-
ficient use of aid. Many financial institutions that have received large 
amounts of aid have failed to attain expected levels of institutional 
efficiency and viability. Thus many countries are stressing resource 
mobilization strategies to help fund agricultural sectors that have been 
buffeted in recent years by weak commodity demand and volatile prices. 
Although the need for domestic resource mobilization is widely 
recognized, there is less consensus about the ability to mobilize rural 
funds. Many policymakers are skeptical that deposit mobilization will 
succeed in rural areas because of low incomes, preferences for non-
financial savings, and unfamiliarity with formal intermediaries. 
This paper discusses rural deposit mobilization in selected Asian 
countries. Some Asian countries have done exceptionally well (especially 
Taiwan and South Korea), but the central argument of this paper is that 
the countries studied (Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thai-
land) have not stressed rural deposits because of cheaper funds avail-
able from donors and governments. Systematic disincentives must be re-
moved before the full potential for rural deposit mobilization can be 
realized. 
DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION AS A SOURCE OF LOANABLE FUNDS 
Although there hav~ been significant year-to-year variations, the 
banking systems in these four countries reported private deposits repre-
senting 50-75 percent of total liabilities between 1970 and 1982 (Meyer 
and Esguerra). There appears to have been a downward trend in Bangladesh 
and the Philippines since 1978, and sine~ 1980 in Indonesia. In Thailand 
the share of deposits fell from 1970 to 1978, then rose to their highest 
level of 79 percent in 1982. Table 1 reports rural deposits as a percent-
age of total deposits.l/ Bangladesh showed a fairly consistent upward 
trend in rural deposits from under 10 percent of total deposits in 1976 
to over 15 percent in 1982. In the other three countries, rural deposits 
have fluctuated widely between 22 and 34 percent with no clear trends. 
These data can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is 
that deposits, and especially rural deposits, have not become signifi-
cantly more important as a source of bank liabilities. A second inter-
pretation is that rural deposits have done well by keeping up with growth 
in total deposits so the rural deposit share is roughly unchanged. While 
private deposits and rural deposits have not been an exceptionally dynam-
ic source of bank liabilities, their growth has not been a drag on re-
source mobilization through financial systems in these countries. 
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Another way to analyze rural deposit trends is through the perform-
ance of specialized rural financial institutions. Such institutions 
should have advantages in rural deposit mobilization because of their 
objectives, thejr location in rural areas and their operational policies 
and procedures. Data were analyzed for the Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB), 
the Philippine rural banking system, and the Thailand Bank for Agricul-
ture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). These institutions are impor-
tant sources of formal agricultural credit. Table 2 reports their sour-
ces of funds for 1978 to 1982. Deposits are overshadowed by other sour-
ces of funds; governments, through central banks, provide the largest 
single source of funds. BKB increased deposits so the deposit share rose 
from approximately 23 percent to about 29 percent, while rural banks in 
the Philippines maintained a deposit share of about 32 percent. BAAC 
deposits represented about 16 percent of total funds in 1978, fell to 12 
percent by 1980, and recovered to 15 percent in 1982. BAAC benefits from 
Central Bank credit and regulations requiring commercial banks to de-
posit funds with BAAC if they do not meet agricultural lending targets. 
These two sources represent 50 to 60 percent of total BAAC funds. 
These three important rural credit sources clearly are not self-
financed by deposits. In fact, they mobilize a smaller share of resources 
than the rest of their respective banking systems. Governments played an 
important role in creating them and continue to support them with funds. 
The sources of deposits are not reported, but it is likely that they come 
from rural and urban sources. 
DETERMINANTS OF SAVINGS BEHAVIOR 
Successful rural deposit mobilization strategies require an under-
standing of the determinants of household savings. Although individual 
studies have arrived at mixed conclusions, a consensus of opinion now 
seems to be emerging. Incentives for both savers and financial insti-
tutions need to be considered. 
Interest Rates 
A fundamental question concerns the influence exerted by interest 
rates on savings. The alternative possibilities are summarized by Lanyi 
and Saracoglu (page 6): "While an increase in interest rate may stimu-
late savings by making future consumption less expensive relative to 
current consumption (substitution effect), it may also tend to reduce 
saving by lowering the amount of present saving necessary to buy a given 
amount of future consumption (income effect)." Their analysis, largely 
based on Asian and Latin American experience, suggests that the substitu-
tion effect is most important in developing countries, although not over-
whelmingly so. Malaysia and Korea are identified as examples where a 
steady policy of positive inflation-adjusted interest rates has led to 
steady growth in financial intermediation. 
The form in which savings are held is more important for deposit 
mobilization than the amount of savings. In countries where interest 
rates have been depressed over long periods, where financial institutions 
and instruments are underdeveloped and fragmented, and where there is 
great economic and political uncertainty, savings are typically held in 
the form of real estate, consumer durables, precious metals and foreign 
currency. Rural savers logically concentrate their wealth in land, 
livestock, crop inventories and jewelry. When interest rate repression 
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is an important d~terminant in this pattern of savings, a substantial in-
rr~ase in interest rates can be expectPd to inctease fjn~ncial savinns. 
Most Asian countri~s have pursued policies which retard growth ot 
the financial sector (Fry). Nominal interest rates are usually set by 
administrative fiat. All countries included in Fry's study (including 
[ndonesia, the Philippin~s. and Thailand) target cr~dit throuRh reilin~s 
and/or floors for credit flows to priority sPctors or harrowers, and 
differentiated interest rates for size, group, sector or location of 
borrower, or source of funds. Subsidized government funds are available 
for rediscounting loans made by commercial lenders or specialized insti-
tutions to priority borrow~rs. These controls frequently lead to low 
rediscount rates for farm lending, and negative real rates for both 
agricultural loans and deposits. 
The interest rate problem is demonstrated in Table 3. Only the 
Philippines' structure of partially floating interest rates permits mar-
ket forces to influence deposit rates. The other three countries administra-
tively fix almost all lending, rediscount and deposit rates. Two key 
relationships are noted. First, the rates paid for some deposits are set 
at levels equal to, or even above, some agricultural loan rates. These 
rates, of course, underestimate effective intermediary costs because they 
exclude the effects of reserve requirements and administrative costs. 
lherefore, effective deposit costs are considerably higher than agrirul-
tural loan rat~s.f/ Second, rediscount rates are frequently lower than 
rates paid on some types of savings and time deposits. The spread be-
tween rediscount and agricultural lending rates is not always large, but 
is frequently larger than for loans from mobilized deposits. 
This interest rate structure shows that financial institutions, 
especially those required or encouraged to make agricultural loans, can-
not afford to mobilize large amounts of private deposits. They must rely 
on rediscount funds and other subsidized funds which are often cheaper 
and more reliable. When lenders mobilize rural deposits, they frequent-
ly channel them to urban areas where lending rates are higher. Savers 
are discouraged by low and negative real rates of return. Therefore, 
interest rate reform is often a necessary first step for increasing in-
centives for both savers and financial institutions. 
Access to Banking Facilities 
Access to deposit-taking facilities is another important factor 
affecting rural deposit mobilization. All four countries have pursued 
policies to expand rural banks and/or branches. However, policies de-
signed to push out credit have created problems in making them finan-
cially viable. Beginning in 1976, nationalized commercial banks in Bang-
ladesh were required to make agricultural loans and to establish two 
rural branches for each urban branch licensed. By 1982, two-thirds of 
the scheduled bank branches were located in rural areas compared to less 
than half in 1976 (Rana). This policy was suspended, however, because 
the expansion was not coordinated, resulting in a surplus of branches in 
some areas and a deficit in others. Furthermore, many rural branches are 
not viable because of the low interest rates for agricultural loans and 
because subsidized rediscount funds are available for only 50 percent of 
agricultural loans. The banks, therefore, are still basically urban-
oriented and channel many rural deposits to urban areas. 
The Philippine Rural Bank Act of 1952 marked the beginning of a 
major effort to expand rural banking. The Government provided equity 
capital for rural banks, technical assistance in bank organization and 
operation, and training of officers. Other incentives were Central Bank 
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rediscounting at preferential rates and exemptions from a variety of 
taxes, charges and fees. Some rural banks accepted demand deposits, but 
now this function has been exclusively granted to commercial banks. The 
number of rural banks multiplied at a fast rate, reaching 931 banks with 
1,029 offices by 1978 (Lee and Jao), but serious loan repayment problems 
have created great financial problems for many rural banks and slowed 
their e~pansion. 
The Bank of Thailand relaxed its control over opening new commercial 
bank branches in 1975. About three times as many branches were opened in 
1976 as compared to the average number opened per year during the prev-
ious four years. However, the rate of expansion slowed in 1977 because 
banks experienced difficulty in meeting credit targets requiring that at 
least 60 percent of local deposits must be lent locally and at least 
one-third of the loans had to go to farmers (Meyer, Baker and Onchan). 
2ther Determinants of Deposits 
Besides interest rates and access to financial institutions, other 
less well-documented factors influence rural deposit mobilization. Sever-
al countries have successfully used prizes, raffles, lotteries, and other 
devices to stimulate deposits. Prizes raise the effective rate of return, 
while raffles and lotteries offer the possibility of an exceptionally 
high return and appeal to the gaming spirit of savers. Complicated pro-
cedures for making and withdrawing deposits lower effective rate of 
return. The value of time to make and withdraw deposits, costs of pass-
books, photographs for identification cards, and other miscellaneous 
costs can significantly reduce real returns. Von Pischke argued that the 
most important advantage for rural people may be convenience, that rural 
deposits may be more ''service" than interest elastic. 
Although the potential for rural deposits is great, the unit cost 
for the financial institution per depositor or account may be large for 
small deposits made by rural people. Some costs and procedures identi-
fied above are used to screen out small deposits. Innovations and stream-
lined procedures are required to reduce costs and open up deposit possibil-
ities for more savers. Some of the huge subsidies currently spent for 
agricultural loans should be directed towards experiments with savings 
innovations so solutions to these problems will be more quickly found. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major rural financial institutions in Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand have not been very successful in mobilizing 
rural deposits. Fragmentary data suggest, however, that a large untapped 
potential exists. Institutions heavily engaged in agricultural lending 
often have few incentives to mobilize rural deposits. Rules, regulations 
and incentives are geared towards expanded lending. Administered inter-
est rate structures combined with high reserve requirements are major 
disincentives for deposit mobilization. Rediscount and other government 
funds are cheaper than deposits. Interest rate reforms are required that 
increase the return to savers, raise the cost of refinance funds rela-
tiv~ to deposits, and increase the lender's return from rural loans. 
Establishing floating rates in the Philippines and the recent increase in 
rP.discount and lending rates for agriculture in Bangladesh are steps in 
the riRht direction. The expansion in rural banking can be reinvigorated 
through proper incentives to savers and intermediaries. 
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Huge amounts of capital are going to be required in the future as 
developing countri~s continue to modernize agricultur~. The wide fluctu-
ations in rural in<'omf's experiPnred :in many c·otmtries during thf' p.lst 1-P, 
V<'ars have mc~ant additional tinan1'ial riem.1nds to hc~lp Lu·ms PV£->n out (',tsh 
flow. foreign sources ot tunrls are likely to be more limited in the 
future than in the past. Therefor~, the deposit mobilization potential 
in rural areas must be tapped. The past one-sided emphasis on cheap 
agricultural loans with related disincentives for deposit mobilization 
must be reversed. The creation of viable financial institutions with 
active deposit mobilization activities should become a high priority. 
Notes 
1/ Data on rural deposits are at best approximate indications of depos-
its by rural households. Undoubtedly some urban households and bus-
inesses have deposits in rural areas and some rural households have 
urban deposits. 
2/ The average cost of funds to an intermediary is, of course, lower 
than these rates because come deposits earn low or zero rates of 
intf'rest. 
Table 1 
Rural Deposits as a Percent of Total Deposits 
1976-1983 
Country 
Year Bangladesh Indonesia Philippines Thailand 
(Percent) 
1976 9.7 25.8 NA 34.2 
1978 13.6 23.5 31.9 31.9 
1980 14.9 22.0 24.6 33.8 
1982 15.6 27.4 30.7 34.1 
--·-----~ -----~ -- -- --~--·--- ---
Source: 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Papers by Mridha, Siswanto, TBAC and Bavovada. 
Table 2 
Share of Deposits for Selected Institutions 
1978-82 
Philippines 
Rural 
BKB Banks 
(Percent) 
23 32 
25 32 
25 31 
28 32 
29 32 
BAAC 
16 
14 
12 
15 
15 
Sources: Asian Development Bank; TBAC; Bank of Thailand, Quarterly 
Bulletin, December, 1983. 
Table 3 
Selected Loan, Rediscount and Deposit Rates 
Country 
Rate Banglades~/ Indonesia~/ Philippines£/ Thailan~/ 
(Nominal Interest Rates Per Annum) 
Lending Rates for Major 
Agricultural Preograms: 
Short-term credit 
Medium/Long term credit 
Deposit Rates: 
Demand 
Savings 
Time 12 months & over) 
12 & 17.5 
13 - 14 
4.5 - 8.5 
10 
14 
Rediscount Rates for Agriculture 6 
9 - 13.5 floating 
10.5 floating 
3 - 9 floating 
9, 12 - 15 floating 
18 - 19 floating 
3 - 4 floating 
7 - 14 
7 - 16 
0.5 - 9 
9 
13 
5 
Source: Meyer, Richard L. and Emmanuel F. Esguerra, "Rural Deposit Mobilization in 
Selected Asian Countries", APRACA Workshop on Rural Savings Mobilization, 
October 3-5, 1984, Manila, Philippines. 
a/ All rates effective from October 1980 for all scheduled banks. Recent changes in 
loans and rediscount rates for agriculture not included. 
b/ Data as of 1984 except lending and rediscount rates are for 1982. 
~/ Data as of March 9, 1984. 
d/ Data as of 1982. 
0'\ 
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